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CASE STUDY
The factualization of ‘I suppose’ 
in American English: a corpus based study 




This work provides a case study centered on the cognitive phenomenon of factualization, viz. “the SP/W’s increasing 
certainty about the realization of an event or situation” (cf. Tantucci 2014, 2015a, b, 2016b). Factualization corresponds 
to a cognitive-control mechanism (i.e. Kan et al. 2013) specifically occurring in the epistemic domain. It instantiates 
both in online language production and throughout the diachronic reanalysis of a construction (i.e. grammaticaliza-
tion, semasiological change or constructionalization, cf. Traugott and Dasher 2002; Traugott and Trousdale 2013). The 
case presented here focuses on the diachronic change of the epistemic construction I suppose in British English. It will 
be shown that I suppose developed through time an increasingly factual usage out of an original meaning convey-
ing weak epistemicity. Qualitative and quantitative data from the Corpus of Historical American English will support 
the general claim that—to varying degrees—epistemic predicates diachronically tend to develop new polysemies 
encoding a Speaker/writer’s (henceforth SP/W) “subjectified form of certainty” towards a proposition P (cf. Tantucci 
2015a: 371).
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and indicate if changes were made.
Background
This work provides a case study centered on the cogni-
tive phenomenon of factualization, viz. “the SP/W’s 
increasing certainty about the realization of an event or 
situation” (cf. Tantucci 2014, 2015a, b, 2016b). Factualiza-
tion corresponds to a cognitive-control mechanism (i.e. 
Kan et  al. 2013) specifically occurring in the epistemic 
domain. It instantiates both in online language produc-
tion and throughout the diachronic reanalysis of a con-
struction (i.e. grammaticalization, semasiological change 
or constructionalization, cf. Traugott and Dasher 2002; 
Traugott and Trousdale 2013).
The case presented here focuses on the diachronic 
change of the epistemic construction I suppose in BE 
(British English). It will be shown that I suppose devel-
oped through time an increasingly factual usage out of an 
original meaning conveying weak epistemicity. Qualita-
tive and quantitative data from the Corpus of Historical 
American English (COHA,1 cf. Davies 2010) will support 
the general claim that—to varying degrees—epistemic 
predicates diachronically tend to develop new polysemies 
encoding a Speaker/writer’s (henceforth SP/W) “subjecti-
fied form of certainty” towards a proposition P (cf. Tan-
tucci 2015a: 371). In cognitive psychology, recent studies 
on perceptual/linguistic cognitive control and ‘conflict 
monitoring theory’ (cf. Norman and Shallice 1986; Desi-
mone and Duncan 1995; Botvinick et al. 2001; Miller and 
Cohen 2001; Schlaghecken and Martini 2012), have 
shown that “experiencing [perceptual or linguistic] ambi-
guity appears sufficient to yield conflict adaptation” (Kan 
et  al. 2013, p. 647). Accordingly, this study will provide 
evidence to show that epistemic uncertainty is itself a 
form of cognitive conflict between two propositions: P is 
true vs. P is false. In this sense, synchronic and diachronic 
1 Project website: http://corpus.byu.edu/coha/. Last accessed 2-10-15.
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phenomena of factualization are to be intended as a gen-
eral embodied impulse to resolve epistemic conflicts in 
favor either of the former (P is true) or the latter (P is 
false). This paper will provide diachronic evidence to sup-
port confirm that cognitive control mechanisms can be 
operationally observed to occur in the epistemic domain. 
It is organized as follows: in “On factuality” section I pro-
vide a brief overview about the notion of factuality where 
a special emphasis is given to Narrog (2002, 2005a, b, 
2009, 2012) and Tantucci (2015a) approaches. In “On fac-
tualization” section I discuss the notion of fatualization 
as a form of semasiological subjectification. In “The fac-
tualization of I suppose in American English” section the 
main case-study of this paper is given, as I provide quan-
titative and qualitative data about the factualization of I 
suppose from the COHA across the nineteenth and the 
twentieth century.
On factuality
Factuality in the literature is alternatively labeled as ‘rea-
lis’ (e.g., Mithun 1999; Palmer 2001), ‘factivity’, ‘reality’, 
‘actuality’ (e.g., Kiparsky and Kiparsky 1971; Chung and 
Timberlake 1985; Papafragou 2000), or ‘validity’ (Kiefer 
1987; Dietrich 1992). It broadly refers to the pragmatic, 
semantic or grammatical encoding of a proposition 
that is communicated as a ‘fact’, or in other words, as an 
event/situation posited as ‘real’, in opposition to what is 
unreal, hypothetical or possible.
In Narrog (2002, 2005a, b, 2009, 2012) factuality is 
counterposed to modality in that he defines the latter 
as the domain marking the non-factuality or ‘undeter-
mined-factuality’ of an event. With this premise, modally 
unmarked assertions are generally employed to posit a 
situation/event as a fact (Narrog 2005b: 187):
(1)  mary is at home now.
(2)  mary may be at home now.
In Narrog’s account, the main semantic function of 
the epistemic modal may in (2) is to suspend the factual 
meaning conveyed in (1). Along a similar line of thought, 
in Tantucci (2015a) it is pointed out that factuality in lan-
guage is entailed by SP/W’s marked certainty about the 
state of affairs of a situation. In this sense, factual state-
ments can be pragmatically paraphrased as As (I am sure 
that) P is true, P. This is tested in (1a) below, which is log-
ically inconsistent, in comparison with in (2a), which is 
perfectly acceptable:
(1)  (a) *Mary is at home now, (although) I am 
not sure.
(2)  (a) Mary may be at home now, (although) I’m 
not sure.
(2a) above—is semantically open to challenge as it 
suspends the factual status of the utterance. Quite dif-
ferently, the factual assertion (1a) entails SP/W’s subjec-
tive certainty about the actualization of the event Mary 
being at home in the real world. It follows from this that 
“an assertion is pragmatically and logically factual as long 
as it is not marked by constructions encoding epistemic 
uncertainty” (cf. Tantucci 2015a: 374). On the other 
hand, modally marked propositions are logically consist-
ent with constructions expressing doubtfulness or hesi-
tancy on behalf of SP/W.
On factualization
The process of factualization can be observed diachroni-
cally or during online speech production. It corresponds 
to the SP/W’s increasing certainty about the realization 
of an event or situation (cf. Tantucci 2014, 2015a, b, 
2016b). Diachronically, factualization occurs in the form 
of ‘subjectification’ (Traugott 1989, 1995, 2003, 2010, 
2012; Traugott and Dasher 2002; Langacker 2008, 2009). 
The latter notion is generally addressed semasiologically, 
viz. by focusing on a form–meaning pair L (lexeme or 
construction) and the changes that the meaning M of L 
undergo through time (cf. Geeraerts 1997). Simply put, 
“subjectification is the semasiological process whereby 
linguistic expressions acquire subjective meaning. In par-
ticular, it refers to the tendency whereby lexical material 
tend[s] to become increasingly based in the SP/W’s sub-
jective belief state or attitude to what is being said and 
how it is being said. (Traugott 2003: 25; see also 1989: 35, 
1995: 47)”.
The literature on subjectification in the last 15 years is 
extremely vast and diverse. A famous example of epis-
temic subjectification is first given in Sweetser (1990: 
52) who proposes that the epistemic domain is to be 
understood in terms of a metaphorical mapping from 
the socio-physical world of obligation (the ‘root’/deon-
tic domain) to the world of reasoning (the epistemic 
domain):
(3)  (a) You must be at home by ten. (Mom said 
so.) [deontic]
  (b) You must have been home last night. 
[epistemic]
(Sweetser 1990, p. 61)
To explain, must in (3b) above is comparatively more 
subjectified that it is in (3a) as it encodes SP/W’s personal 
belief towards a proposition P. As put by Sweetser, in (3a) 
“the direct force of mom’s authority compels you to come 
home by ten” (1990, p. 61) with SP/W exerting external 
control over the AD/H: s/he tries to affect directly the 
state of affairs of AD/R’s actions. Quite differently, in 
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(3b) must is comparatively more subjectified as SP/W 
exerts a form of epistemic control over a proposition P. 
In this latter case, SP/W is making a subjective attempt 
to find some certainty about a proposition P (see Nuyts 
2001; Tantucci 2013, 2016a on the intersections between 
subjectivity and epistemic modality). Correspondingly, 
Traugott (1989: 43) argues that some modals in English 
not only show a diachronic shift from non-epistemic 
to epistemic, but also from relatively ‘weak’ to ‘strong’ 
epistemicity.
In line with this idea, Tantucci (2015a) provides a syn-
chronic collostructional study (cf. Stefanowitsch and 
Gries 2003) about the epistemic polysemy of the BE pred-
icates I think, I believe and I reckon and a diachronic cor-
pus-based survey about the process of factualization of Io 
penso ‘I think’ in Italian. What emerges from the results 
of both studies is that epistemic predicates encoding dif-
ferent levels of (un-)certainty all seem to progressively 
develop new polysemies expressing a subjectified form 
of certainty. In other words, it shown statistically that 
epistemic predicates expressing different levels of con-
jecture or guess diachronically all tend to be increasingly 
employed in contexts of factuality.
Factualization theory is grounded in Langacker’s ‘epis-
temic control cycle’ model (cf. Langacker 2008, 2009). 
The latter essentially provides a constructional taxon-
omy of different stages of confidence according to which 
SP/W considers P as a fact. What crucially emerges from 
the data presented in Tantucci (2015a) is that predicates 
originally expressing a comparatively weaker form ‘epis-
temic inclination’ towards the truthfulness of P, show 
a general diachronic tendency to expressing ‘epistemic 
result’, viz. a new subjectified form of certainty upon the 
factuality of P.
Examples (4) and (5) below are representative respec-
tively of an inclinational usage of Io penso ‘I think’ in the 
time span 1861–1900 and one of epistemic result in the 
last period 1968–2001 from the diachronic corpus of 
written Italian (cf. Onelli et al. 2006):
(4)  Nel tempo in cui l’ imperatore Enrico sog-
giogò la Sicilia, era nella Chiesa di Palermo 
un decano, di nazione, secondo ch’io penso 
tedesco.
  ‘At the time when the emperor Enrico sub-
jugated Sicily, in the Church of Palermo 
there was a dean, his nationality was, I think, 
German.’
(diaCORIS – Saggistica – Miti, Leggende e 
superst. del Medio Evo – Graf Arturo 1892)
(5)  francamente penso che la democrazia deve 
ora fare il massimo sforzo revisionistico ed 
evolutivo (a sinistra)
  ‘Frankly, I think democracy has now to make a 
greatest revisionist and evolutionary e ort (to 
the left)…’.
(diaCORIS – Miscellanea – Una scelta di vita – 
Amendola Giorgio 1976)
In (4) Io penso expresses a positive attitude towards 
the factuality of P, yet not absolute certainty. This can 
be easily tested by adding an inclinational mitigator 
such as anche se non ne sono sicuro ‘although I’m not 
sure’. Quite differently (5) corresponds to a statement 
of epistemic-result, expressing a subjectified form of 
factuality. In fact, the indicative form (conveying factu-
ality) is here employed instead of the expected subjunc-
tive one (the grammatical mood expressing irreality in 
Italian) after mental state predicates or ‘verba dicendi’. 
Moreover, different from (4) above, now the addition 
of an inclinational element like anche se non ne sono 
sicuro ‘although I’m not sure’ will now lead to logical 
inconsistency:
(4)  (a) Nel tempo in cui l’ imperatore Enrico sog-
giogò la Sicilia, era nella Chiesa di Palermo 
un decano, di nazione, secondo ch’ io penso 
tedesco, anche se non ne sono sicuro.
  ‘At the time when the emperor Enrico subju-
gated Sicily, in the Church of Palermo there 
was a dean, his nationality was, I think, Ger-
man, although I am not sure.’
(5)  (a) *Francamente penso che la democrazia 
deve ora fare il massimo sforzo revisionis-
tico ed evolutivo (a sinistra), anche se non ne 
sono sicuro.
  ‘Honestly, I think democracy now has to 
make a greatest revisionist and evolutionary 
e ort (to the left), although I’m not sure.’
Despite the recent findings on diachronic and syn-
chronic cases factualization (i.e. Traugott 1989; Tan-
tucci 2015a, 2016b), me must note that elsewhere it is 
proposed that epistemic adverbials do show a tendency 
to acquire a more ‘discourse’ function, which is argued 
to convey a lesser degree of factuality (cf. Capone 2001). 
Similarly, Capone also suggests that verbs of knowledge 
seem to become epistemically weaker (Capone 2000) 
whereby clitics appear to compensate this trend (Capone 
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2013). These points might suggest that more cases of fac-
tualization phenomena need to be empirically observed 
before we can draw general conclusions about factualiza-
tion as a general tendency of change. Important to note is 
also that clines of change of the so-called ‘weaking kind’ 
are observed in qualificational shift from epistemicity to 
evidentiality (cf. Nuyts 2012), viz. ones that are charac-
terized by a shift from evaluational to presentative illo-
cutionary force (cf. Tantucci 2016a). However, it is still 
under debate wether along a merely epistemic-modal 
cline of change phenomena of epistemic weakening (or 
de-factualization) have occurred at all. This work aims at 
extending the application of factualization theory. It will 
be emphasized that diachronic factualization constitutes 
a cognitive phenomenon which can be observed cross-
linguistically. To achieve this, the rest of this paper pro-
vides a case-study about the diachronic factualization of I 
suppose across the nineteenth and the twentieth century 
in American English.
The factualization of I suppose in American English
Mental verbs carrying an epistemic meaning, such as I 
think, I believe or I reckon are polysemous: they originally 
indicate a specific mental activity, i.e. the act of thinking 
without an epistemic stance being conveyed. Through 
time, they progressively acquire a more central argumen-
tative use: I think P as P is my personal opinion.
 In the latter case they can express whether SP/W 
is inclined to believe that P is true, whether SP/W has 
reached the conclusion that P is true or they can ultimately 
express whether SP/W is subjectively sure about the truth-
fulness of P. Concerning this point, Simon-Vandenbergen 
(1996: 405–406) points out that I think in different contexts 
can express lack of commitment as well as certainty. Hol-
mes (1990: 187) also distinguishes between tentative and 
deliberative usages of I think, the former profiling a limited 
commitment to the truth, the latter conveying confidence 
and certainty (cf. also Holmes 1984: 354). In a similar fash-
ion, Traugott (1995: 38) argues that I think developed a 
more subjectified meaning conveying a speaker’s epistemic 
attitude. Nuyts (2001: 113) also considers that the verb to 
think can express either epistemic possibility or certainty. 
Tantucci (2015a) observes that epistemic predicates show a 
tendency to acquire new factual polysemies through time, 
viz. from epistemic inclination (expressing guess or con-
jecture) to epistemic result (conveying SP/W’s certainty). 
Interestingly while evidence suggests that factualization 
occurs as a widespread and unidirectional phenomenon, 
there is no data in the literature that might suggest cases 
of de-factualization, viz. a process of semantic change of 
verbs of certainty towards uncertainty.
Similar to I think, I believe or I reckon, the predicate I 
suppose is polysemous, as it may either express epistemic 
inclination (viz. the SP/W’s positive intention to con-
sider P as a fact) or epistemic result (viz. SP/W’s subjecti-
fied certainty about P). Consider the following synchronic 
examples:
(6)  well, he started playing footsie–footsie with me 
[…]. I suppose he might have had cramp or 
something.
BNC
(7)  I suppose I absolutely must marry.
COCA
In (6) above the usage of I suppose encodes SP/W’s epis-
temic inclination as SP/W gives a tentative explanation for 
someone’s behavior. The inclinational force of the utter-
ance in (6) is constructionally made explicit through the 
employment of the modal might, which is adopted to mark-
edly suspend the factuality of P (cf. Narrog 2002, 2005a, b, 
2009, 2012; Tantucci 2015a). On the other hand, I suppose 
in (7) appears in a statement expressing SP/W’s subjec-
tive confidence about the truthfulness of P. This is due to 
the felicitous co-occurrence of I suppose with the predicate 
absolutely, the latter inherently expressing epistemic result. 
In fact, while SP/W’s statement in (6) cannot be presup-
posed as a fact in a subsequent proposition, I suppose in (7) 
can be felicitously referred back as a factual statement:
(6)  (a) Well, he started playing footsie–footsie with 
me […]. I suppose he might have had cramp or 
something. * His cramp was due to P.
(7)  (b) I suppose I absolutely must marry. The rea-
son I must marry is that P.
To better explain, it is generally agreed that presupposi-
tions semantically encode factuality. They correspond to 
an implicit assumption about the world or background 
belief relating to an utterance whose truth is taken for 
granted in discourse (Stalnaker 1974, 1999, 2002; Tan-
tucci 2016b). A presupposition refers a proposition Q the 
factuality of which is taken for granted by the producer 
of an utterance and which must be known and taken 
account of for the utterance to make sense to an inter-
preter (cf. Cruse 2006: 138; Fetzer 2011: 32). Presuppo-
sitions instantiate through specific constructions, which 
in the literature are generally referred to as presupposi-
tion triggers PT (cf. Stalnaker 1974, 1999, 2002; Delogu 
2009; Huang 2011; Fetzer 2011). PT formally correspond 
to constructional instantiations of a presupposed element 
Q: i.e. temporal clauses, cleft sentences, counterfactual 
conditionals and other constructions.
In the cases of (6) and (7) above, the cleft-sentences his 
cramp was due to P and the reason I must marry is that P 
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both presuppose Q as a fact, respectively: he had cramps 
and I must marry. However, while in the case of (7) a pre-
supposition is logically allowed, in the case of (6) the fac-
tual meaning expressed through the presupposition his 
cramp was due to P is not epistemically consistent with 
the previous inclinational construction I suppose he might 
have had cramp. As a result of this, it can be concluded 
that the degree of subjectified factuality of an epistemic 
predicate (i.e. I suppose, I think and so on) can empiri-
cally tested by looking at whether P may be subsequently 
presupposed as a fact.2
The factualization of I suppose in American English: a 
method of enquiry
SP/W’s epistemic stance is often communicated through 
the intersection of predicates expressing different degrees 
of beliefs/certainty together with additional surrounding 
elements, i.e. epistemic modals or adverbials. In the case 
of (6) and (7) above, the illocutionary force expressed by 
SP/W shifts from inclination to result precisely due to 
the co-occurence of surrounding items such as might or 
absolutely.
What is of interest for the present analysis is to assess the 
degree of co-occurrence of an epistemic predicate of weak 
certainty (i.e. I suppose, I reckon) with additional elements 
which may contribute to conveying a subjective ‘factual-
ized’ meaning. In other words, this work aims at providing 
additional evidence to show that epistemic predicates tend 
to become increasingly ‘factual’ over time, in the sense that 
they tend to occur more and more frequently in contexts 
where SP/W expresses a subjectified form of certainty. 
To demonstrate this on a quantitative level, I consulted 
the diachronic corpus of American English (COHA) and 
selected the 100 most frequent adverbial co-occurrences 
with I suppose within a 1L-4R word-span (cf. Capone 
2001 on modal adverbs and discourse). Among those, I 
then restricted my analysis to all the adverbials conveying 
either an inclinational (i.e. maybe, possibly) or a result epis-
temic meaning (i.e. surely, absolutely). The identification 
2 As suggested by a reveiwer, it may be argued that an expression like I sup-
pose may need not be considered as a construct conveying uncertainty but 
rather a mere mental activity of a general type. As a result, a proposition 
such as I suppose John is at home, I saw his car parked here would simply 
mean I know by deduction that he is at home. On the other hand, the mean-
ing of I suppose John is at home cannot be merely restricted to the ‘mental 
act of supposing’. From a pragmatic angle, the statement directly triggers a 
conversational—or rather conventional—implicature that directly impinges 
on SP/W’s epistemic stance: I am (inclined) to conclude that P. By uttering 
so, SP/W is not necessarily conveying that I know that P, as s/he can subse-
quently defeat P by suspending its factuality: i.e. but who knows?, though I 
am not sure. The usage is to be considered as ‘factualized’ in constructs that 
include adverbials of results, entailing absolute factuality, such as the afore 
mentioned absolutely.
of inclinational vs. result adverbials was based on the test 
provided in (6a–7a). See (8–9) below:
(8) A: I understand you’re looking for a job.
  B: Yes, I am. I suppose I’m really looking for a 
home.
COHA Enchanted Cottage 1945
(8)  (a) B: Yes, I am. I suppose I’m really looking 
for a home. The reason why I am looking for a 
home is P.
(9)  I suppose maybe you think something might 
have happened to me or something.
COHA The Real Dope 1919
(9)  (a) I suppose maybe you think something 
might have happened to me or something. 
* The reason why you think something might 
have happened is P.
Similar to the case in (6–7), even in (8–9) above it is 
possible to disentangle an inclinational meaning from a 
result one. In fact, while in (8a) the complement clause of 
I suppose can be subsequently presupposed as a fact, in 
the case of (9a) the inclinational meaning of I suppose co-
occurring with maybe cannot be subsequently presup-
posed as a factual statement.
The raw frequency from this dataset is given in the 
Tables  1, 2 encompassing a period of 160  years below 
(from 1810 to 1960):
The normalized frequency per each decade of respec-
tively result and inclinational adverbials co-occurring 
with I suppose is visually given in the Fig. 1.
As the two straight trend lines3 encompassing the 
whole period suggest, result adverbials show an increas-
ing tendency to collocate with I suppose, while the nor-
malized co-occurrence with inclinational adverbials is 
slightly decreasing.
What crucially emerges from the data above is that 
while result usages of a predicate of weak epistemicity 
such as I suppose are diachronically increasing, on the 
other hand adverbs expressing epistemic inclination do 
not show the same tendency. Even more importantly, 
the difference between result and inclinational usages of 
I suppose during the first 8 decades is significantly lower 
in comparison with the period running from 1890 till the 
end of 1960 (Fisher exact test, p < 0.0005).
3 In statistics, trend-line calculation (which can be automatically obtained 
in most of graph-editing softwares available) is an approach for modelling 
the average relationship between a scalar dependent variable y and one or 
more explanatory variables denoted x.
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Given these points, we may conclude that I sup-
pose underwent a process of factualization across the 
nineteenth and the twentieth century as it shows an 
increasing tendency to appear in contexts where SP/W 
idiomatically expresses a subjectified form of certainty. 
This evidence has been provided to support the dia-
chronic unidirectional hypothesis of factualization.
Conclusion
Evidence suggests that factualization is a universal phe-
nomenon, which can both be tested diachronically or 
during online language production. Focusing on the 
former, the present work supported the idea that factu-
alization instantiates semasiologically as a form of sub-
jectification. It complemented the hypothesis proposed 
in Tantucci (2015a) about the unidirectional tendency of 
epistemic predicates to develop new factual polysemies 
and to be increasingly employed in contexts where SP/W 
expresses a subjectified form of certainty. The quantita-
tive and qualitative analysis of this study is centered on 
the semantic change of the predicate of weak epistemicity 
I suppose across a time span of 160 years from the Corpus 
of Historical American English.
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